The Technological and Institutional Heritage of WWII in Japan

Su Qi / Deputy Chief Editor, Caijing Magazine / 2015-05-11

Elitism is not the only factor that explains the overall high quality of the Japanese industry and its contribution to the rise of Japanese manufacturing. The “dispersion effect” during wartime can also provide some explanations in this regard.

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The rapid reboot of Japan’s economy in the postwar period has always been a popular topic, as people have different interpretations as to its reasons. Some believe Japan benefited from the industrial policy (which was a legacy of the economic control stipulated during war time) and also supportive financial policies. Others have argued that the wartime experience equipped the Japanese government with expertise in industrial guidance. The Americans only indicted the military and cabinetduring the postwar occupation of Japan, but generally let the officials overseeing the economy off the hook. The preferential industrial policies are still in place today.

People have also disagreed on what other legacy Japan’s economic pattern during the war left that contributed to postwar economic rejuvenation and technological innovation.

Elitists believe that Japan already grasped advanced technologies before and during WWII, which laid a solid foundation for industrial revival after the war ended. It is largely Western discrimination that says industrial growth in Japan was achieved based on “imitation.”

When Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda visited Britain in 1961, he was asked by the British press about accusations of imitation and piracy. The designer of the Mitsubishi A6M Zero, JiroHorikoshi, who was about 60-years-old at the time, wrote a thesis on the fighter jet he had designed 25 years earlier to apply for a doctoral degree out of sheer patriotism. He pointed out that the Zero fighter jet had better performance than Western counterparts and was widely deemed an outstanding product worldwide. Airplane development reflects the overall industrial level of a country. Therefore, it is not fair to underrate the technologies embodied by the Zero fighter jet. The technological advantages Japan enjoyed went far beyond just the “imitation and tricks” alleged by some critics. They also embraced a unique philosophy and mindset which contributed to their world leadership in innovation.

Some have argued that the likes of JiroHorikoshi manifested the state-led elitism adopted by Japan as a technologically innovative country since the Meiji era. Horikoshi’s achievement, which was made with awareness of other geniuses in the course of conducting research and work, exceeded the expectations ofauthorities who had invested in Horikoshi’s training as an elite in the context of a capitalist society.

Horikoshi became a first-year aviation major at the University of Tokyo and graduated with high marks before joiningthe Mitsubishi Aircraft Corporation. The aircraft machinery department at Mitsubishi was the core of Japan’s heavy industry before the outbreak of WWII and paralleled the Nakajima Aircraft Company in the aviation industry. The company tailored training programs for Horikoshi by sending him to aircraft factories in Germany and the United States after he was quickly familiarized with basic formulas and designs of the planes. Five years later when he was back in Japan for intelligence work, Horikoshi was promoted to designer-in-chief of the new fighter jet when he was only 29 years old.

People had doubts about how Horikoshi entered the spotlight in the first place. There were dozens of new employees who had just joined the aviation manufacturing department of Mitsubishi. So what was the criteria for talent identification? The answer is mostly the degree. The University of Tokyo was the top university at that time, and it was the only university that hosted an aviation science department. The merit of picking talents based on their academic achievement was proven by the final outcome, as it laid a solid foundation for effective talent distribution.

Executives at Mitsubishi had plans to train Horikoshi as the designer-in-chief upon his arrival at the company. The attempt proved successful, which made not only Horikoshi the winner, but also benefited some others. An airplane was designed by a team composed of 20-30 design engineers led by the designer-in-chief. Horikoshi already had two years of experience as a team leader with cooperative spirit before the onset of the Zero fighter jet design. The fighter jet was by no means an overnight production, but a masterpiece stemming from the Japanese social mechanism prior to the outbreak of war.

The purpose of running the aviation business in Mitsubishi reflected the labor of division and coordination of the entire industry. The quality of human capital includes both individual and collective qualities. However, elitism is not the only factor that explains the overall high quality of the Japanese industry and its contribution to the rise of Japanese manufacturing. In fact, criticism of Horikoshi’s limited experience also pointed to the fact that the Zero fighter jet was never put into mass production. So the “dispersion effect” during wartime can also provide some explanations in this regard.

Public mobilization created great opportunities for groups who were separated by the dual structure in the past to interact with and “encourage” each other.The National Mobilization Law issued in 1938 and the National Requisition Ordinance published in 1939 transferred a great portion of the labor force to the military supply industry. As many as 2.3 million university and middle school students were dispatched to the factories after the end of the war.

Aside from the new labor entry, many seasoned workers from other industries were forced to migrate into the military supply industry. Polls conducted in Tokyo showed that many of these workers used to work for textile, printing and other consumption goods manufacturing and commercial supply industries, with most of the enterprises being small and medium sized. This migration exerted great impact on improving education.

In the previous dual economy model, small and medium enterprises (SME) barely had anything to do with prestigious senior schools and imperial colleges. People were confined by a psychological barrier that kept them from making further progress. This psychological resistance referred to one’s unwillingness to receive a college education after finishing the compulsory education, even if one could afford it. This was partly due to a lack of eagerness for higher education or degrees at many levels of society in the first place. For instance, some employees of commercial businesses became apprentices at stores or joined business institutions after they graduated from their compulsory education. There were only a limited amount of people aspiring for higher education.

In the incredibly massive military supply industry, graduates with top-notch degrees gained an upper hand and rose to the top. Workers with lower academic records at small and medium enterprises felt the power of education. But even after they were struck by the reality, there was no improvement in upward mobility and nothing really changed. However, people were still granted access to colleges, which in turn, triggered their desire for higher education. The contact effect with the social economy started to disperse.

The contact effect was further spread during wartime, as people who worked at SMEs or were waived of requisition became involved. The policy of economic control during wartime reached every corner of society and imposed strict regulations on the price of capital and raw materials. The Enterprise Licensing Ordinance that came into effect in 1942 sparked mergers and acquisitions of SMEs, which saw SMEs lose autonomy after being absorbed by conglomerates or formed into a centrally-controlled coalitions. For survival, SMEs had to communicate more with the government, councils in charge of economic control, as well as big companies. The dual economy mode was gradually weakened and led to two majoroutcomes: creating an effective coordinated production network integrating both big firms and SMEs, and stronger motivation to receive higher education in order to improve career prospects.(Translated by Suwen Feng)